This study examines a factor that has thus far received little attention in research on attitudes toward violent in-group defense, namely, the role of perceived parental ethnic socialization. We hypothesized that perceived parental ethnic socialization (i.e., cultural socialization, egalitarianism, bias/mistrust) 
Over the past few decades, several Western European countries have witnessed political polarization on issues of culture, religion, and ethnicity (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Moors, Balogh, Van Donselaar, & De Graaff, 2009 ). This has resulted in conflicts between ethnic and religious groups (Stroink, 2007) , threatening peaceful coexistence and social cohesion. Several researchers have suggested that there is a relation between increasingly hostile anti-Islam sentiments and religiously or ethnically motivated violence in Europe (Abbas, 2012; Pantucci, 2011; Stroink, 2007) . Violence is committed by right-wing extremists targeting immigrants (or those seen as supporters of immigrants) and radical Muslims committing violent acts in retaliation for violence against Muslims elsewhere in the world or perceived threats to their religion (Stroink, 2007) . The latter are often the children of immigrants.
The Netherlands ranks among the European countries with the highest level of anti-Muslim sentiments (Savelkoul, Scheepers, van der Veld, & Hagendoorn, 2012) . As Dutch Muslim immigrants are increasingly confronted with hostility (Dagevos & Huijnk, 2012) , they may feel their in-group is threatened. Thus, some Dutch Muslims might distance themselves from mainstream society (Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013; Moors et al., 2009) or come to believe that their own religious or cultural identities are superior (Doosje et al., 2013) . Ultimately, this may lead to the belief that the use of violence in defense of their religion or ethnicity is an appropriate response to the perceived aggressor (Doosje et al., 2013; Moghaddam, 2005; Sageman, 2008; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001 ). An example is the Hofstadgroup, a group of young Dutch Muslim radicals who planned and committed violent acts in defense of their religion in the Dutch city of The Hague. The group members legitimized their acts by claiming that Muslim citizens had been rejected and mistreated by Dutch society and that their religion, which they perceived as superior, was repressed and imperiled (Vidino, 2007) .
Ethnic or religious violent action is a complex phenomenon with many possible routes, causes, and precursors in which the interaction between the social environment and individual predispositions is crucial (Moghaddam, 2005) . Collective identity factors-such as in-group connectedness, collective relative deprivation, connectedness with mainstream society, and in-group superiority-play an important role in the process leading to violence (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Doosje et al., 2013; Moghaddam, 2005; Stroink, 2007) . A person's collective identity is shaped by socialization in a range of contexts, including school, the peer group, social media, and home. In this study, we focused on the role of socialization at home, more specifically, the role of parents. The literature on youth's attitude toward violence in defense of the in-group has largely overlooked the potential role of parents, while research on parental ethnic socialization has rarely addressed children's attitudes toward violent in-group defense (Pels & De Ruyter, 2012) . In this paper, we build on previous research, by not only examining how perceived parental ethnic socialization affects the collective identity of children but also how this, in turn, may be related to children's attitude toward violent in-group defense and willingness to use such violence themselves.
As the primary socializing agents, parents likely play an important role in youth's (collective) identity development and influence how their children cope with hostility toward their group. Social learning theory (Bandura, 1986) contends that parents are a model for children's attitudes and views. The theory posits that if children recognize their parents' expressions and behavior as meaningful and in line with their needs, the children subsequently cognitively process and retain these parental cues. Following social learning theory, we postulate that children learn their views on defending their ethnic and religious in-group (and the concomitant motives, rationalizations, and attitudes) by observing their parents' behavior, expressions, emotions, and reactions to their own behavior. Muslim minority parents have to balance the preservation of ethnocultural and religious identities with adaptation amid a hostile societal climate. The emphases in this balancing act may influence how adolescents position themselves in their ethnic community and in wider society. This, in turn, may protect adolescents from or make them more susceptible to positive attitudes toward violent in-group defense.
In this paper, we examine the influence of parents on the views and attitudes of Turkish Dutch Muslim youth. Using a structural equation model (SEM), we explored in what way perceived socialization of parents is associated with their children's attitudes vis-à-vis different ethnic or religious groups and children's willingness to use violence to defend the in-group. We focused on ethnic socialization, that is, socialization processes that have a bearing on ethnicity, race, culture or religion, and interethnic group relations (see Hughes, Rodriguez, Smith, Johnson, & Spicer, 2006) . We examined youth's perception of parental socialization instead of reports by parents, because a prerequisite for adopting parental views and behavior regarding in-group defense is that children perceive these views as adequate and meaningful. Thus, the perceptions of parents' intentions, instead of the parents' actual intentions, are likely to play a role in youths' collective identity formation and susceptibility to violent in-group defense. A potential problem with measuring children's perceptions of parenting is that they might project their views on their parents, leading to an overestimate of the influence of parental socialization. Therefore, we also tested an alternative model in which the paths were reversed, running from collective identity to perceived parenting.
Parental Ethnic Socialization, Collective Identity Factors, and Attitudes Toward Violent In-Group Defense
According to social learning theory, children are influenced by their parents'
behavior. This behavior expresses the norms, values, and ideals held by parents.
Through their ethnic socialization practices, parents intentionally or unintentionally transmit their ideals and values regarding ethnicity, race, culture, religion, and interethnic group relations to their children (Hughes, Rodriguez, Smith, et al., 2006; Hughes, Rivas, Foust et al., 2008; Pels & De Ruyter, 2012) . In a meta-review covering 45,000 parent-child dyads of numerous ethnic groups in the United States and Europe, Degner and Dalege (2013) found evidence of parent and child similarity in bias, prejudice, and stereotyping, with medium effect sizes.
We hypothesized that the path from parental ethnic socialization to violent ingroup defense runs via four key factors identified in research that investigated precursors of (attitudes toward) ideology-based violence among second-generation Muslim youth (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Doosje et al., 2013; Doosje, Feddes, & Mann, et al., 2012; Mazarr, 2004; Moghaddam, 2005; Stroink, 2007) . These factors, which can be summarized as collective identity factors, are in-group connectedness, collective relative deprivation, connectedness with mainstream society, and in-group superiority.
Perceived parental ethnic socialization is conceptualized in this study as the strategies found by Hughes et al. (2006) and Hughes et al. (2008) in their U.S. research among several ethnic groups: (a) cultural socialization (teachings about own culture), (b) egalitarianism (stressing that we are all equal), (c) bias (emphasizing inequality and discrimination) and (d) mistrust (be on your guard against the other). Our analyses indicated the presence of only three of these four types: bias and mistrust formed a combined factor (see the Methods section). People have a need for a positive group identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) . Cultural socialization, that is, passing on cultural and ethnic heritage (e.g., traditions, values, ethnic pride, language, and cuisine), results from the importance ethnic minorities attach to maintaining their in-group culture (Hughes et al., 2008) . Studies have shown that immigrant parents are successful in transmitting ideas and values of ethnicity, religion, and intergroup interactions to their children (e.g., Branch & Newcombe, 1996; Carol, 2014; Güngor, Fleischmann, & Phalet, 2011; Idema & Phalet, 2007; Maliepaard & Lubbers, 2013; Nauck, 2001; Phalet & Schönpflug, 2001 ; but see Aboud & Doyle, 1996) .
Research by Hughes et al. (2008) on four ethnic groups in the United States showed that parents who felt greater attachment to their ethnic group reported more cultural socialization practices. Several studies found that cultural socialization facilitates children's knowledge about their ethno-racial group and that it leads to more favorable in-group attitudes (validated for African Americans and Mexican Americans, see Stevenson, 1995; Umaña-Taylor & Fine, 2004) . From a social learning theory perspective, this can be interpreted as parents providing their children with many positive examples of in-group cultural practices that foster in-group attachment.
Therefore, cultural socialization is likely to have a positive relation with in-group connectedness.
Collective relative deprivation of the group one identifies with is considered an important element in the process of developing an understanding of the use of violence in defense of one's ethnic or religious identity (Moghaddam, 2005) . Collective relative deprivation originates from the perception that one's in-group is unfairly treated worse than other groups (whether in cultural, political, religious, or socioeconomic terms; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner 2006; Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012) . This perception may go hand-in-hand with feelings of anger and dismay (Smith et al., 2012) .
Collective relative deprivation has been shown to have a positive relation with a broad range of outcomes such as collective action, deviance, and hostile intergroup attitudes (Smith et al., 2012) , as well as with attitudes toward violent in-group defense among Muslim youth (Doosje et al., 2013; Moghaddam, 2005; Stroink, 2007) .
In the presence of a sense of collective relative deprivation, in-group connectedness can trigger another critical factor associated with attitude toward violent in-group defense, namely, perceived superiority of the in-group (Doosje et al., 2012; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002) . In general, believers (of any religion) consider themselves to be living a morally good life. This may turn into moral superiority if they are absolutist believers (that is, they believe that their religion or faith is the only true one, in contrast to pluralists or falibilists) and if they believe their faith is threatened by other believers or infidels. Feelings of moral superiority based on being a Muslim may emerge as protection of the self-image for Muslim youth who perceive their identity to be under attack by society at large (Geelhoed, 2011) . Feelings of superiority based on a collective identity, in turn, have been shown to be related to positive attitudes toward violent in-group defense (Doosje et al., 2012 (Doosje et al., , 2013 Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & GinierSorolla, 2010) . Furthermore, researchers have shown that sympathy for others who use violence to defend their religious orientation and ethnic origins increases willingness to use such violence oneself (Doosje et al., 2013) . Thus, we hypothesized that cultural socialization would be positively associated with in-group connectedness, which, for those who experience a sense of collective relative deprivation, would be related to increased feelings of religious superiority. Collective relative deprivation thus would act as a moderator of this relationship. Superiority would be associated with more positive attitudes toward violent in-group defense by others and, subsequently, with a higher intent to use such violence (H1).
Socialization of Bias and Mistrust, Collective Identity Factors, and Attitudes

Toward Violent In-Group Defense
Muslim parents in the Netherlands may feel they have to socialize their children amid a relatively hostile climate in which Muslim youth have a lower status in society than majority Dutch youngsters (Dagevos & Huijnk, 2012) and are confronted with discrimination (Pels & De Ruyter, 2012) . Muslim parents may therefore believe that it is important to prepare their children for understanding and dealing with such bias (Pels, 2006) . This form of ethnic socialization in which parents attempt to foster awareness of, and resilience against, discriminatory practices is generally referred to as preparation for bias (Hughes et al., 2006) . In addition, parents may inculcate an attitude of distrust in their children, mostly referred to as the ethnic socialization type promotion of mistrust (Hughes et al., 2006) . This form of socialization entails that parents spread messages of caution and wariness about other ethnic and/or majority groups and advise their children to maintain a social distance from these other groups. Hughes and Johnson (2001) have shown that parents who perceived that their children had been unfairly treated by other ethnic groups were more likely to warn children about intergroup relations and promote a sense of mistrust. In line with predictions based on social learning theory, studies have shown that parents pass on their defensive or mistrustful attitudes to their children (Degner & Dalege, 2013; Hughes et al., 2008; Nauck, 2001) . We postulated that when Turkish Dutch youth feel that their parents emphasize the risk of being confronted with bias in mainstream society because of their ethnic or religious group membership they may evoke youth's feelings of being treated unfairly as a group. These feelings may furthermore lead youth to develop a sense of collective relative deprivation. This, in turn, may result in claims of moral superiority as a counterstrategy, in turn increasing positive attitudes toward violent in-group defense by others, as well as the likelihood of willingness to use such violence oneself (Doosje et al., 2013) 
(H2).
Researchers have shown that perceived rejection of the in-group by mainstream society is associated with decreased national Dutch identification in the case of young Dutch Muslims (Doosje et al., 2013; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007) . Perceptions of rejection by mainstream society can result from youth's own experience but may also result from perceived ethnic socialization. Socialization of bias and mistrust may create the impression that the in-group has been rejected by mainstream society and thus lead to a diminished sense of connection to mainstream society. Doosje et al. (2013) found that feeling socially disconnected was associated with Muslim Dutch youth's positive attitudes toward violent in-group defense. Thus, we hypothesized that socialization of bias and mistrust, through a decrease in connectedness with mainstream society, would be associated with a more positive attitude toward violent in-group defense and, subsequently, with increased willingness to use such violence oneself (H3). Doosje, & Pels, 2015) . Therefore, we hypothesized that if Turkish Dutch youth perceived parental egalitarian messages, the youth would feel more connected to Dutch society, and they would be less likely to have positive attitudes toward violent in-group defense by others and lower willingness to use such violence themselves (H4). In addition, it seems likely that Turkish Dutch youth who report that their parents spread messages of egalitarianism will feel less superior as Muslims, because they have adopted the idea of equality between religions. A lower sense of Muslim superiority is expected to lead to a less positive attitude toward the use of violence to defend the in-group and, subsequently, less willingness to use such violence oneself (H5). Finally, if parents are perceived to express that all ethnic and religious groups are of equal value, then feelings of collective deprivation likely will be reduced. This would be related to lower levels of perceived superiority as Muslim and associated with a less positive attitude toward the use of violence for in-group defense and use of such violence oneself (H6).
Socialization of Egalitarianism
Turkish Dutch Muslim Youth
With a population of about 400,000, Turkish migrants and their descendants are the largest immigrant group in the Netherlands (Dagevos & Huijnk, 2012) . Turkish Dutch are predominantly Muslim (95%), and most are Sunni (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2009 ). During the 1960s, Turkish immigrants from mostly rural areas came to the Netherlands as guest workers to fill the lower segments of the labor market (as in other European countries such as Germany and France). Although the second generation has made notable gains in education compared to their parents, the Turkish community is in a disadvantaged socioeconomic position compared to the Dutch majority (Dagevos & Huijnk, 2012) 
. Turkish families in Western Europe demonstrate what Portes and
Rumbaut (2001) called "selected or lagged acculturation" (Phalet & Schönplug, 2001 ).
They show high levels of ethnic retention, for example, in terms of use of native language, partner choice, and high primary identification as Turks, as well as low rates of interethnic contact with majority Dutch (Dagevos & Huijnk, 2012; Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011) .
Studies have shown that Turkish Dutch youth have high ethnic identification as
Turkish and high religious identification as Muslim (Dagevos & Huijnk, 2012; Ersanilli, 2009 ). Ethnic and religious identification among Turkish Dutch has a positive correlation (Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2014 ).
This correlation is more pronounced among the second generation than among the first (Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2014) . Verkuyten and Martinovic (2014) observed, "Members of groups holding multiple disadvantaged statuses experience these social categories (i.e. religion and ethnicity) in close association and simultaneously" (p. 66), which may generate "an inclination for simplified (that is, overlapping) social identity structures" (2014, p. 66) . Turkish Dutch youth are thus likely to see their Muslim and Turkish identities as overlapping.
Previous studies have shown that some children of Turkish migrants agree that violence can be a justifiable method for defending the in-group (Schiffauer, 1999; Slootman & Tillie, 2006; Huijnk, Andriessen, & Sterckx, 2015) . In a survey among Turkish Dutch Muslims in Amsterdam, 37% of youths (age 16-18) showed a combination of religious orthodoxy with the feeling that Islam is under attack by modern society and is a focal point of political conflict (Slootman & Tillie, 2006) . A more recent study showed that 11% of Turkish Dutch show some or a lot of understanding of people using violence to defend their faith, including 14% of the 15-to 24-year-olds. Of this age group, 17% indicated they had some or a lot of understanding for people traveling from the Netherlands to the Islamic State (Huijnk et al., 2015) .
Method Sample and Participants
The data in this paper came from the Young and Diverse survey conducted from April until July 2011 at secondary schools in the Netherlands. Eleven schools were included in the full sample; however, the sample retained for the analyses in the present study was from seven schools (not all schools had Turkish Dutch pupils). The schools were selected based on their ethnic composition. Schools with a high percentage of immigrant origin youth were oversampled to obtain a large enough sample for statistical analyses. The percentage of Turkish Dutch pupils in the sample (15%) was higher than the total percentage of students of Turkish origin enrolled in Dutch schools (3.5%, Statistics Netherlands, 2012). Of the schools in this study, in three schools more than 95% of the pupils had a non-Western immigrant background, in three schools more than 50%, and in one school approximately 30%. We followed a procedure of passive informed consent by parents in addition to written informed consent by the respondents; the boards of the participating schools notified the parents and informed them of the content and aim of the study, allowing parents to refuse to allow their child to participate in the research. The school board of one school, however, stated that participation by their pupils in surveys deemed important by the school had been incorporated in their school policy to which the parents had agreed by enrolling their children in the school. Respondents gave their written informed consent before participating. One family refused to allow their child to participate, and two students opted out. The first author was present during data collection to introduce the study and to answer questions. A teacher was present in the classroom to keep order while the students filled out the survey.
A survey website with restricted access was designed especially for the study. A total of 970 students filled out the survey. For this paper, we analyzed a subset of all Turkish Sunni (N = 133) students in the sample 1 (Turkish ethnicity, 97%; Turkish Kurdish ethnicity, 3%; 48% boys) from seven schools and 25 classes, age 14 to 18 years (M = 15.58, SD = 0.95). We chose age 14 as the threshold for participation in the study as willingness to use violence to defend the in-group is rare before this age (Sageman, 2008; Slootman & Tillie, 2006) . The Turkish Dutch respondents were enrolled in all tiers in the Dutch secondary education system (vocational training, 32%; higher Connectedness with mainstream society. We also used the PAS, but in this case, the items of psychosocial connectedness to Dutch majority culture (D-PAS; e.g., "Dutch people understand me"). Answers were rated on the same 5-point Likert-type scale as connectedness with the in-group. The Cronbach's alpha for this scale of 6 items was .81.
Perceived in-group superiority as Muslims. To assess perceived in-group superiority based on Islam and Muslim identity, three items were chosen from a longer questionnaire used by Doosje et al. (2013; e.g., " It makes me angry when people are not proud of being Muslim"; "It would be best if everyone were Muslim"). Response options varied from (1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree). The score was calculated as the mean across the three items. Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .67. 3
Collective relative deprivation. Collective relative deprivation was assessed with three items taken from Doosje et al. (2012) and Doosje et al. (2013) ; e.g., "I think people of my ethnic background or religion do not get as many chances as others in the Netherlands"; "People of my ethnic background or religion are discriminated against in the Netherlands"). The 5-point Likert-type scale ranged from 1 (disagree completely) to 5 (agree completely). We created a scale using the mean score of the three items (Cronbach's alpha = .68). Turkish identification). The respondents were categorized by comparing the country of birth of both parents with the respondents' self-identification (the latter was the determinant in the case of mixed parentage). At least one of the countries where the respondents' parents were born had to match the self-chosen ethnicity of "Turkish" in order for a youngster to be classified as second-generation Turkish. There were no respondents in the survey whose parents were born in Turkey and who did not identify as Turkish. Finally, we assumed that there were no first-generation immigrants in the survey, because in the Netherlands first-generation immigrants (i.e., those who arrived after the age of 12) receive specific education tailored to their language needs. School classes of this type did not participate in the survey.
Attitude toward violent in-group
Analyses
The hypothesized path model was tested in Mplus. The estimates were calculated using robust maximum likelihood (MLR) and were controlled for clustering at the class level. The number of schools (seven) was too low to run a multilevel model controlled for school and class effects.
Because of the small size of the sample, we did not include the measurement model in the SEM analysis. Instead, we used sum scores for each variable measured with multiple items (see above). Since boys are known to be more likely to use violence than girls (Carr, 2006) , we included gender as a covariate on all variables in the model (not depicted). Table 1 As hypothesized (H1), the final model included a path from perceived cultural socialization to in-group connectedness with a positive coefficient. Contrary to this hypothesis, the relation between in-group connectedness and in-group superiority as Muslims was not moderated by collective relative deprivation; instead, we found a direct path. The path continued as expected from in-group superiority as Muslims to attitude toward and then to willingness to use violence to defend the in-group. In addition to the path from cultural socialization via in-group connectedness to in-group superiority as Muslims, there was also a direct path from perceived cultural socialization to in-group superiority as Muslims, which had not been hypothesized.
Results
Thus, when Turkish Dutch children reported that their parents aimed to pass on their Turkish heritage, this led to a modest increase in these youngsters' sense of superiority as Muslims. Furthermore, there were direct paths from in-group connectedness and from in-group superiority as Muslims to willingness to use violence. Last, there was an unpredicted path from in-group superiority as Muslims to connectedness with mainstream society to attitude toward and then willingness to use violence. The more Turkish Dutch youth feel that Muslims are superior, the less they feel connected yo Dutch society 8 and the higher the understanding of and willingness to use violence to defend the in-group.
Socialization that stresses bias and mistrust, as predicted (H2), was associated with a stronger sense of collective relative deprivation, which as expected was related to stronger in-group superiority as Muslims and continued to more favorable attitudes toward violent in-group defense and willingness to use such violence. Stronger in-group superiority as Muslims had a negative relation with connectedness with mainstream society.
In line with the third hypothesis (H3), perceived bias and mistrust socialization was negatively related to connectedness with mainstream society, leading to a more positive attitude toward violent in-group defense and willingness to use such violence.
The results also showed an unexpected direct path from bias and mistrust socialization to increased in-group superiority as Muslims.
For perceived egalitarian socialization, we found support for a positive association with connectedness with mainstream society (H4) leading to a more negative attitude toward the use of violence and less willingness to use it. We also found support for the hypothesis on a path from perceived egalitarian socialization to a lower sense of in-group superiority as Muslims and then to a less favorable attitude toward violent in-group defense and the use of such violence (H5). Finally, the hypothesized path from perceived egalitarian socialization to a lower sense of collective relative deprivation (H6) was not supported by the final model.
In sum, there were pathways from all three ethnic socialization types via collective identity factors to willingness to use violence to defend the ethnic or religious in-group, although the pathways showed some deviations from those initially hypothesized. Table 2 presents the estimates of the total indirect effects of all three ethnic socialization types on willingness to use violence via all pathways in the final model. Insert Table 2 here.
As Table 2 shows, all three socialization types have a significant, albeit modest, indirect effect on willingness to use violence to defend the in-group. In total, the paths from perceived ethnic socialization types accounted for a little more than 5% of the variance in understanding of the use of violence for in-group defense and for nearly 6% of the variance in willingness to use violence for in-group defense. Cultural socialization accounted for 2.5%, bias and mistrust 2%, and perceived egalitarianism 1.2% of the variation in willingness to use violence for in-group defense. Not all indirect paths from socialization to violence to defend the in-group were statistically significant. As the effect sizes were low, most of the shorter paths were statistically significant. The final model explained 17% of the variance in understanding the use of violence and 45% of youths' own willingness to use violence to defend the ethnic or religious in-group. As expected, a positive attitude toward violent in-group defense by others was a strong predictor of willingness to use violence and explained 13.4% (p < .001). However, ingroup superiority was also a strong predictor. Feelings of in-group superiority as Muslims play a pivotal role in the model, mediating almost all other paths to willingness to use violence to defend the in-group. The total (direct and indirect) effect of this variable accounted for 11.4% (p < .001) of the variance in willingness to use violence.
Discussion
Previous studies have shown there are many routes to radicalization and the use of ethnic and religious violence (Moghaddam, 2005) . In this study, we examined the relation between perceived parental ethnic socialization and willingness to use violence to defend the in-group. We looked at a sample of children of Turkish Muslim immigrants to the Netherlands. In line with our hypotheses, we found that perceived parental ethnic socialization (i.e., cultural socialization, egalitarianism, bias/mistrust) is indirectly related to attitudes toward violence in defense of the in-group by others as well as willingness to use such violence via its relationship with collective identity factors (ingroup connectedness, collective deprivation, religious superiority, connectedness with mainstream society).
These results fit with social learning theory that presumes children learn their views (and concomitant motives, rationalizations, and attitudes) by observing the behavior, expressions, and emotions of close family members, notably their parents.
More specifically, our study, focusing on ethnic socialization, showed that youth who perceive that their parents express that individuals are equal regardless of their ethnicity (egalitarianism) also have less favorable attitudes toward the use of violence to defend the in-group. These findings are in line with the results by Hughes et al. (2006) and Hughes et al. (2008) that showed there is similarity in egalitarianism between parents and their children. Furthermore, we found that children who feel that their parents raise awareness of discrimination or teach them that other ethnic groups cannot be trusted have a more positive stance toward ethnic and religion-based violence. These youth appear to believe that their parents transmit feelings of rejection by the majority society, as well as the propensity to mistrust, which previous studies have indicated are important risk factors in generating understanding of ethnoreligious violence (Doosje et al., 2012 (Doosje et al., , 2103 Stroink, 2007) .
Cultural socialization is often seen as a prerequisite for the healthy development of youth's self-concept (Phinney, Ferguson, & Tate, 1997) . In contrast, the present study indicates that in the case of Turkish Dutch youth, youth who reported more cultural socialization also reported a collective identity that makes them more likely to have favorable attitudes toward using violence. This relation found for Turkish Dutch youth might be a consequence of a political climate in which Muslims are constantly negatively portrayed (Ghorashi, 2010) .
Furthermore, whether young Turkish Dutch felt connected to mainstream society was significantly related to their attitudes toward and willingness to use violence for in-group defense. This is in line with studies by Doosje et al. (2012 Doosje et al. ( , 2013 , which reported a significant path to violence through social disconnectedness. However, the relationship we found was weaker than in Doosje et al.'s (2013) study.
This may be because social disconnection is a concept much more closely related to alienation (underpinned in literature on ethnic or religious violence as the precipitating factor); whereas the indicator we used (connectedness with mainstream society) has a wider scope.
The relations we found between perceived parental socialization and collective identity factors are broadly in line with previous studies on parental transmission of minority group identity and norms on interethnic relations (e.g., Carol, 2014; Güngör et al., 2011) . However, the analyses also revealed several nonhypothesized paths. We had hypothesized that the effect of connectedness with the in-group on perceived superiority as Muslims would be moderated by a sense of collective deprivation. However, the analyses showed an unmoderated path. This might be because the relation is moderated by perceived group threat instead of by collective deprivation. We did not measure perceived group threat in our study. Perceived group threat may also explain the direct path found from in-group connectedness to willingness to use violence. This is also what Doosje et al. (2013) found in their study.
We had hypothesized that cultural socialization would lead only to a stronger ingroup connectedness. However, we also found a weak positive relation with perceived superiority as Muslims. This suggests that perceived parental messages about the importance of the ethnic culture, including religion, not only may give youngsters a positive self-image of their group but can also generate pride and even a sense of superiority. However, it is possible that this relation is specific to the context under study: a climate that is rather hostile to Muslim migrant groups. The societal context may also explain the positive relation between bias/mistrust socialization and perceived superiority as Muslims and the negative relation between connectedness with mainstream society and perceived superiority as Muslims. Islamophobia may trigger "fighting back" in defense of one's in-group (Stroink, 2007) .
The study has several limitations. First, several factors that may play a role in the relationship between parental socialization and violence to defend the in-group could not be taken into account. These factors include socioeconomic position and the degree of ethnic diversity of the schools. Furthermore, the model should be extended to include personal experiences of discrimination and perceived group threat in addition to perceptions of collective relative deprivation as additional factors that can lead to (dis)connection from mainstream society (Ghorashi, 2010) . The residual correlation between cultural socialization and willingness to use violence may suggest such an omitted mediator variable. Another factor that should be added to future models is the role of age. The size and low variation in age in our sample did not allow us to examine the effects of this variable. However, it would be interesting to explore how the effects of parenting may vary in relation to the age of the children.
Second, this study used ethnicity to measure in-group connectedness and religion to measure in-group superiority. Although there is a significant overlap between ethnic and religious identification among Turkish Dutch youth, the difference between the measurements of in-group connectedness and in-group superiority may have affected the estimates of their relation with each other and with willingness to use violence to defend the in-group. Future research should aim to distinguish between ethnic and religious identities in the measures of identification and the motivation to use violence.
A third limitation is the low number of items we used for several concepts in this study. This may have led to lower reliability of the measurement that, in turn, may have led to an underestimation of the strength of the correlations in the model. Fourth, this study focused on children's perception of parental socialization, instead of parents' actual socialization practices. Although our reasons for doing so were related to social learning theory, critics might claim we should have measured parental socialization through parental reports as well. However, the path model in which the paths run from collective identity factors to socialization types (i.e., a model of projection) has a considerably worse fit than the model with paths from socialization types to collective identity factors. This lends support to our argument that perceived parental socialization affects collective identity, instead of vice versa. Future studies that include socialization practices as reported by parents could further examine our argument. In addition, it would be relevant to distinguish between mothers' and fathers' viewpoints, as they may differ in their ethnic socialization messages (Pels, 2006) . Furthermore, as parents may change their socialization approach in response to the attitudes and behavior of their children, a longitudinal approach would be the optimal design. A longitudinal approach is furthermore desirable as the processes that lead youth to a favorable attitude toward violent in-group defense are dynamic. The crosssectional nature of this study limits our ability to make strong claims about the causal relations among ethnic socialization, collective identity factors, and violent in-group defense.
A fifth limitation, related to the generalizability of our findings, is the modest sample size. Although we used several robustness checks, including power-adjusted modification indices, a comparison of alternative models, and the calculation of bootstrapped confidence intervals of the indirect effects, the modest size of the sample might have led to an over-or underestimation of the size of the relationships between ethnic socialization types and attitudes toward violence to defend the in-group. many societies. Examples of violent radical youth are not limited to Turkish Dutch youth or to immigrant youth (see, for instance, Ghorashi, 2010, on radicalization among Moroccan Dutch youth or Van San, Sieckelinck, and De Winter, 2010, or Doosje et al., 2012 , for examples of violent Dutch native radicalized youth). Our findings suggest that for immigrant youth one of the factors that may encourage or inhibit a path to becoming prepared to use violence to defend the in-group is the messages they perceive they receive from their parents. Although the study showed that the overall effect size of ethnic socialization type on propensity to show an understanding of or willingness to use violence is small, the results, nevertheless, suggest that parents, and the wider communities, should be made aware of the potential impact of educating children to distrust the other and should be supported in communicating and reflecting with children on the complicated task of positioning themselves in the context of increased polarization and stigmatization.
Footnotes
1 Of the 143 students with one or both parents born in Turkey, five identified as nonreligious. They were left out of the analyses since one of the collective identity factors (religious superiority) could not be measured for these respondents. In addition, five out of 143 students identified as Alevi. These respondents were also left out of the analyses, as Alevism is considered a very different religion from Sunni Islam and not all Alevis consider themselves Muslims (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2009 
